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Federal Affirmative Action After Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
The ideal of racial equality has been a part of American history
and politics since the dispute over slavery that led to the Civil War
and the subsequent passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments.' Despite the long history of that ideal, many
still believe that "[w]e live in a world of racial inequality"2 to this
day. Affirmative action is one method by which legislatures and
other governmental bodies at local, state, and federal levels have
sought to achieve racial equality. Most of these attempts, however,
have met with "fundamental disputes over the nature of the legal
1. The Thirteenth Amendment provides for the abolition of slavery. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII. The Fourteenth Amendment provides for, among other things, equal
protection of the laws and due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fifteenth
Amendment deals with voting rights. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
2. T. Alexander AleinikoffA Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060,
1065 (1991). Aleinikoff continued:
In almost every important category, blacks as a group are worse off than whites.
Compared to whites, blacks have higher rates of unemployment, lower family
incomes, lower life expectancy, higher rates of infant mortality, higher rates of
crime victimization, and higher rates of teenage pregnancies and single-parent
households. Blacks are less likely to go to college, and those who matriculate are
less likely to graduate. Blacks are underrepresented in the professions, in the
academy, and in the national government.
Id at 1065-66 (citing A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS & AMERICAN SOCIETY 3-32 (Gerald
Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989).
3. In discussing "affirmative action," Professor Aleinikoff refers to "race-conscious
programs and policies aimed at ameliorating the continuing social and economic
consequences of several centuries of American racism." Id. at 1060. Another scholar
defines affirmative action as "giving blacks marginal preferment in decision-making in
[education, the workplace and government]." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Permissive
Affirmative Action for the Benefit of Blacks, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 379. George
Rutherglen provides a little more detail with respect to affirmative action in the
employment context:
Most affirmative action plans are framed as a long-term goal to be achieved
according to a short-term ratio. The long-term goal usually is to increase the
proportion of workers from a specified minority group in a particular job until
it matches the proportion of those workers in the relevant labor market. A
typical goal might be to increase the proportion of black workers in a particular
job until it reaches twenty percent. Such long-term goals usually are achieved by
hiring or promoting black workers over the short term in some higher proportion,
for instance, fifty percent.
George Rutherglen, After Affirmative Action: Conditions and Consequences of Ending
Preferences in Employment, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 343-44. Affirmative action is also
often referred to as "benign" racial classification. See infra note 49.
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prohibitions against discrimination."4 Whenever such disputes have
reached the United States Supreme Court, beginning with Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,' the Court has had to decide
the extent to which race-based distinctions were allowable in order to
achieve a "colorblind society.' ,6  After two decades without a
consensus on the Court, illustrated by plurality decisions and sharp
dissents,7 the Court overturned its own recent precedent8 and held,
in Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena,9 that federal affirmative action
programs are subject to strict scrutiny. In Adarand, the Court
reviewed laws that require federal agencies to provide incentives to
contractors for hiring subcontractors owned by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, and which presume that
minorities are such disadvantaged individuals." Although the Court
remanded to the lower court as to the constitutionality of the laws at
issue, the majority nevertheless indicated that the test to be applied
to determine the constitutionality of affirmative action measures is the
familiar strict scrutiny test, which holds that laws "are constitutional
only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.""
The decision comes as no surprise in view of the present political
climate in the United States, characterized by anti-affirmative action
initiatives such as the proposed Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1995,12 the proposed Equal Opportunity Act of 1995,"3 the Univer-
4. Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 339.
5. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6. Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1062. Aleinikoff explains that the "norm of
colorblindness is invariably traced to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson." I
at 1062-63 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
7. See infra notes 86-187 and accompanying text (discussing the case history of
affirmative action).
8. See infra notes 172-87 and accompanying text (discussing Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 499 U.S. 547 (1990)).
9. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(2), (3) (1994). The term "minorities" includes Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Pacific Americans. Id. §
637(d)(3)(C).
11. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. This is strict scrutiny, which, although not clearly
defined, the Court first conceived in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944)
("[A]I legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect.... [C]ourts must subject [these restrictions] to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions.").
12. S. 26, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The proposal would end the use of racial and
gender preferences (such as quotas, set-asides, and numerical goals or objectives) by the
federal government in hiring or promoting federal workers or granting federal contracts;
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sity of California Board of Regents' decision to eliminate affirmative
action from its admissions programs, 4 and the proposed California
Civil Rights Initiative." Adarand's requirement that strict scrutiny
be applied to review federal affirmative action programs severely
limits the federal government's ability to use race-based measures to
achieve racial equality. The decision's effect on the future of
affirmative action remains unclear, however, because like so many of
its predecessors, it illustrates the Court's ambivalence about the
subject and gives little guidance to lower courts that must answer the
question of whether any affirmative action programs remain
constitutionally permissible.
After discussing the facts of the Adarand case,'6 this Note
explains the Court's decision and reasoning.' Following this case
summary, the Note traces the standard of review for racial clas-
sifications as it has evolved in the Supreme Court's five major
affirmative action decisions.'" The Note then analyzes what the
Adarand opinion provides in terms of guidance about federal
affirmative action, 9 what questions it leaves unanswered,' and,
finally, what the future of affirmative action may hold.2 In
conclusion, the Note suggests that the decision represents the
beginning of the end of affirmative action, but without further
prohibit the federal government from encouraging or requiring contractors to utilize racial
or gender preferences with respect to their employees, suppliers, or subcontractors; and
only allow affirmative action in recruitment efforts as long as racial and gender preferences
are not used. A similar bill, called the "Civil Rights Act of 1995," is being considerel for
introduction by Rep. Charles T. Canady (R-Fla.). Abigail Thernstrom, A Class Backwards
Idea:. Why Affirmative Action for the Needy Won't Work, WASH. POST, June 11, 1995, at
C1.
13. S. 1085, H.R. 2128, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The bills provide that the federal
government may not grant race or gender preferences in federal contracts, employment,
or other programs or activities. Id.
14. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., California Board Ends Preferences in College System,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al (late ed.). The Regents voted 14 to 10 to "stop admitting
students, hiring professors and awarding contracts on the basis of race and sex." Id.
15. This initiative would "forbid[] the state to use race, sex, color, ethnicity or national
origin as a criterion for either discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to,
any individual or group in employment, contracts, and education." K.L. Billingsley,
California Civil Rights Initiative Targets Affirmative Action, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995, at
A3.
16. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 36-85 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 86-187 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 200-16 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 217-37 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 238-59 and accompanying text.
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clarification, the law remains sufficiently uncertain to allow limited
efforts at affirmative action by the federal government.2
Adarand Constructors, Inc., a highway subcontractor, submitted
a bid for guardrail work to Mountain Gravel & Construction
Company, a contractor that had won the prime contract for a highway
construction project in Colorado in 1989.' Although Adarand's bid
was the lowest, the contract went to Gonzales Construction Company,
a company certified as a disadvantaged business enterprise because of
its owner's minority status. This status allowed Mountain Gravel to
receive additional compensation from the government.2' Adarand
challenged the law requiring federal agency contracts to include such
provisions for disadvantaged subcontractors,' claiming that the law
22. See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
23. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
24. Id. Pursuant to the prime contract between the Central Federal Lands Highway
Division and Mountain Gravel & Construction Company, the contractor, Mountain Gravel,
would be compensated with an additional 10% of the final amount of the respective
subcontracts (not to exceed 2% of the original contract amount) for hiring one or more
disadvantaged business enterprises. IL at 2104.
25. Id. at 2102. According to the Adarand Court, the federal laws at issue constitute
"a complex scheme of federal statutes and regulations." Id. The Small Business Act sets
out the federal government's objective of maximizing the opportunities of small companies
owned by socially or economically disadvantaged individuals. Pub. L. No. 85-536,72 Stat.
384, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-650 (1994)). The provisions of the Act
state, in relevant part: "It is the policy of the United States that ... small business
concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,
shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of
contracts let by any Federal agency." Id. § 637(d)(1). "Socially disadvantaged individuals"
are defined as "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias
because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual
qualities," id. § 637(a)(5); and "economically disadvantaged individuals" means "those
socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system
has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared to
others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged," id. § 637(a)(6)(A).
The Small Business Administration has further regulated this area. The Adarand
Court found two of the Administration's programs implementing the statutory directives
of the Small Business Act relevant to its conclusion. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102. First,
the Court explained that the 8(a) program,
available to small businesses controlled by socially and economically disad-
vantaged individuals ... confers a wide range of benefits on participating
businesses, one of which is automatic eligibility for subcontractor compensation
provisions of the kind at issue in this case.
I. at 2102-03 (citations omitted).
In contrast, the Court explained that the 8(d) program applies only to subcontracting
programs. Id. at 2103. Both programs presume social disadvantage for certain minorities,
id. (citing 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105(b)(1), 124.106(b) (1994)), and the 8(d) program also allows
a presumption of economic disadvantage for minorities, id. (citing 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.001,
19.703(a)(2) (1994)). Both presumptions are rebuttable by third parties who show that the
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discriminates on the basis of race in violation of constitutional equal
protection guarantees.26
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, 7 distin-
guishing the case from City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.' by
explaining that Adarand dealt with federal, as opposed to state or
local, affirmative action z9 The court used intermediate scrutiny
under Fullilove v. Klutznick 0 to analyze the laws at issue.31  The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision to analyze the laws under intermediate scrutiny,32 holding
that Fullilove,33  rather than Croson,34 was controlling.35  The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion36 first discussed petitioner
Adarand's standing37 before addressing the application of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the case.38 Next, the opinion
individual is not, in fact, disadvantaged. Id. (citing 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.111(c)-(d), 124.601-
124.609 (1994)). Further, the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act of 1987 requires that at least 10% of appropriated Department of Transportation
funds be expended on small businesses controlled by socially and economically disad-
vantaged individuals. 1d. (citing Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. 132,145 (1987)).
The Act adopts the Small Business Administration's race presumptions. Id. (citing Pub.
L. No. 100-17, § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. 146 (1987)).
26. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
27. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992), affd, 16
F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
28. 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
29. Adarand, 790 F. Supp. at 243-44.
30. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
31. Adarand, 790 F. Supp. at 244-45. In order to pass intermediate scrutiny, the
government must have an important interest in the affirmative action measure, and the
measure had to be substantially related to that interest. Id.
32. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1545 (10th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
33. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
34. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
35. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1543. The court of appeals further concluded that "the
federal government, acting under congressional authority, can engage more freely in
affirmative action than states and localities." Id. at 1545 (citing Ellis v. Skinner, 961 F.2d
912, 915-16 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ellis v. Card, 113 S. Ct. 374 (1992)).
36. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the
majority opinion. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101.
37. Id. at 2104-05. Justice O'Connor found that the high likelihood that Adarand will
again bid on federal subcontracts and lose to disadvantaged subcontractors gave Adarand
standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against future use of discriminatory
compensation clauses. Id. at 2105.
38. Id. at 2105-08. The Court noted that, despite the fact that the Fifth Amendment
was once perceived as not containing an equal protection component, id. at 2106 (citing
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)), cases after 1964 "treat[ed] the equal
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provided a case history of affirmative action, presenting the Court's
recent decisions in cases involving racial classifications designed to
benefit groups that have suffered from past discrimination.39 The
opinion began by discussing the 1978 case Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.4" From Bakke and Fullilove v. Klutznick4t to
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,4 2 the Court wavered between
intermediate and strict scrutiny and failed to produce a majority
opinion.' Justice O'Connor stated that this "left unresolved the
proper analysis for remedial race-based governmental action."'  She
stated that, in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,45 the Court
"resolved the issue, at least in part," when a majority held that strict
scrutiny should be applied to racial classifications whether they
benefited or burdened the particular group.46 She then pointed out,
however, that Croson only applied to local and state action, because
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may give Congress broader
powers,47 and that the Court had held in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as indistin-
guishable." Id. at 2107 (noting that the turning point occurred with McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964)). Thus, while Adarand's claim arose under the Fifth Amendment,
which does not have an explicit equal protection clause such as the one found in the
Fourteenth Amendment, the analysis, according to the majority, should be the same under
both. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106-08.
39. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108.
40. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down a university affirmative action program that
reserved spaces for minorities in medical school classes). For a full discussion of Bakke,
see infra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
41. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a federal set-aside program of public works
projects to minority-owned businesses). For a full discussion of Fullilove, see infra notes
115-31 and accompanying text.
42. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down a race-based preference in the layoffs of
teachers). For a full discussion of Wygant, see infra notes 132-54 and accompanying text.
43. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108-10.
44. Id at 2109.
45. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down a city government's
minority subcontractor set-aside). For a full discussion of Croson, see infra notes 155-71
and accompanying text.
46. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110.
47. Id Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "The Congress shall have the
power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5. The Court used this part of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow the
federal government to exercise more power in the realm of affirmative action than the
state or local governments. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,563 (1990);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,472-73 (1980). For further discussion of § 5 as applied
in these two cases, see infra notes 119-21, 175-77 and accompanying text; for an early case
expounding the § 5 concept see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966).
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FCC"8 "that 'benign' federal racial classifications need only satisfy
intermediate scrutiny.
49
Writing for the Adarand majority, Justice O'Connor then
defended the Court's decision to depart from the Metro Broadcasting
analysis, indicating that Metro Broadcasting itself represented a
departure from precedent since (1) it rejected Croson's explanation
of why strict scrutiny of governmental racial discrimination is
necessary, and (2) it
squarely rejected one of the three propositions established
by the Court's earlier equal protection cases, namely
congruence between the standards applicable to federal and
state racial classifications, and in so doing also undermined
the other two-skepticism of all racial classifications, and
consistency of treatment irrespective, of the race of the
burdened or benefited group.50
The opinion then stressed that "the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups. It
follows from that principle that all governmental action based on race
48. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). For further discussion of Metro Broadcasting, see infra notes
172-87.
49. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-12 (citing Metro Broadcasting, 497 U:S. at 564-65).
The term "benign racial classifications" is essentially a synonym for affirmative action. See,
e.g., John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REv. 723,727 (1974) (describing benign racial classification as situations in which "White
people have decided to favor Black people at the expense of White people"); Kent
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of 'Benign' Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 559, 559 (1975) (equating benign racial classifications with "racial
preferences for ... members of minority groups ... at the expense of non-minority
[persons]"). The Supreme Court of Washington stated that racial classifications are
"benign" if they are "being used to redress the effects of past discrimination," and if "the
persons normally stigmatized by racial classifications are being benefited." DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1182, cert. granted and appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973),
vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam). In his dissent in Adarand, Justice
Stevens distinguished "benign" classifications from "invidious" discrimination, labeling the
former "a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain members of [the]
minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members of the majority."
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112. Justice O'Connor stated earlier in the opinion that
"the Court's cases through Croson had established three general propositions with respect
to governmental racial classifications." Id. at 2111. First, "skepticism" requires that any
racial classification is suspect and must be subject to a searching examination. Id. (citing
Wygant v Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986)). Second, "consistency" stands
for the proposition that it is irrelevant whether the classification burdens or benefits the
classified group; all racial classifications are due the same strict scrutiny. Id. (citing
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989)). Third, "congruence" provides
for an identical analysis of state and federal racial classifications. Id. (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1975)).
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... should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed."'" The Court held that all racial classifications were
subject to strict scrutiny and expressly overruled Metro Broadcasting
to the extent that it is inconsistent with that holding.5 2
The Adarand majority then stated that the purpose of strict
scrutiny is to "distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in
governmental decisionmaking."' 3 Rejecting the idea that benign and
burdensome racial classifications should be subject to different
standards of review,54 the Court stated that racial classifications are
"inevitably perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those
who are granted this special preference are less qualified in some
respect that is identified purely by their race," and that such laws "can
only exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice."55  For that
reason, the Court noted, racial classifications can be acceptable only
if "Congress clearly articulates the need and basis for a racial clas-
sification, and also tailors the classification to its justification."5 6 Also,
regardless of whether the classification is benign or burdensome, the
government causes harm to some people whenever it discriminates on
the basis of race, and strict scrutiny must be used to determine
whether that harm is justified." The Court then rejected the notion
that state and federal classifications should be reviewed under
different standards58 but declined to address the "authority § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with the
51. Id. at 2112-13.
52. Id. at 2113. In a section of the opinion joined only by Justice Kennedy, Justice
O'Connor further justified overruling Metro Broadcasting because (1) it departed from
precedent, (2) it was a frequently criticized decision, and (3) it was recent enough that it
had not yet been integrated into the law. 1d. at 2114-16.
53. l at 2113.
54. ld. at 2113-14. In this section, the Court addressed some of the criticisms of the
majority position that Justice Stevens brought up in his dissent. These include the notion
that burdensome classifications should receive different treatment than benign clas-
sifications, the difference between the powers of state and federal legislatures, and the
doctrinal problems inherent in rejecting the Metro Broadcasting precedent. See infra notes
66-77 and accompanying text.
55. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
56. Id-
57. Id. at 2114.
58. Justice Stevens' dissent advocated this idea of different standards for state versus
federal classifications. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
1266 [Vol. 74
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which the courts
should defer to Congress' exercise of that authority."'5 9
Finally, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts for
consideration of the facts under strict scrutiny,' but emphasized its
rejection of "the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal
in fact.' ""' The Court seemingly left some room for affirmative
action by recognizing that racial discrimination still exists in
America.62
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia explained that, unlike the
majority, he believed "government can never have a 'compelling
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race,"'63 and that "it is
unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program would survive
under this understanding of strict scrutiny."'  Justice Thomas,
writing a separate concurrence, stated that
it is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications
are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those
who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be
disadvantaged....
... So-called "benign" discrimination teaches many that
because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps,
minorities cannot compete with them without their
patronizing indulgence .... These programs stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled"
to preferences.65
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote the first of
three dissenting opinions.66 While agreeing with the majority that
the Court should be skeptical of racial classifications, Justice Stevens
found that there is a difference between classifications resulting in a
59. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114. See supra note 47 for a brief discussion of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
60. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118.
61. ld. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
62. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; see also infra note 209 and accompanying text
(quoting Justice O'Connor's statement that racial discrimination persists).
63. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Scalia joined the majority "except insofar as it may be inconsistent
with" his concurring opinion. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
64. Id at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
65. Id (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
66. Id. at 2120-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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benefit to the minority and those resulting in a burden.67 He stated
that "[t]here is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a
policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks
to eradicate racial subordination .... The consistency that the Court
espouses would disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing'
sign and a welcome mat."68
Justice Stevens then addressed some "important practical and
legal differences between federal and state or local decision-
makers., 69  He pointed out that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the Court to defer to Congress in light of its
" 'institutional competence.' 5)70 Justice Stevens noted that racial
discrimination is more likely to occur at the state and local level than
at the federal level, and that federal affirmative action is more
acceptable because it is approved by representatives of the entire
nation.7 He also emphasized Justice O'Connor's inconsistency on
this issue, pointing out that her Croson opinion supported the idea
that Congress has powers not possessed by the states. 72 He then
stated that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress
at the same time it expressly limits the States. This is no accident. It
represents our Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experience
throughout our sorry history of race relations, that the Federal
Government must be the primary defender of racial minorities."73
Finally, Justice Stevens addressed Metro Broadcasting74 and
found that it did not conflict with Croson and the preceding line of
cases because it presented different issues.75 Instead, he concluded
that Fullilove76 should govern the result in the Adarand case.77
67. Ild. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2120-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. V. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 563 (1990)).
71. Id. at 2125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. See infra note 223 and accompanying text (quoting relevant statement from
Croson).
73. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
74. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
75. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
77. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that
legislation upheld in Fullilove, which used race as the sole criterion for receipt of public
contracts, is far more objectionable than the laws at issue in Adarand, which addressed
social and economic disadvantage in addition to racial characteristics. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens noted other distinguishing factors which would indicate that
the Adarand laws should be upheld. First, under those laws, businesses that "were once
[Vol. 741268
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Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer." He agreed with Justice Stevens that stare decisis com-
pelled the application of Fullilove, under which the laws at issue in
Adarand would pass muster.79 He added that "a majority of the
Court today reiterates that there are circumstances in which
Government may, consistently with the Constitution, adopt programs
aimed at remedying the effects of past invidious discrimination.""0
Finally, Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Breyer.8'
She found that the Court's intervention in the case was unnecessary
because of the political attention currently being paid to affirmative
action. 2  She also agreed with Justice Stevens that decisions
evaluating federal programs in light of the Fourteenth Amendment
should receive judicial deference. 3 She reemphasized the majority's
statement that strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact," and that the
majority opinion properly calls for a searching review "to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decision-
making."'  Justice Ginsburg concluded: "While I would not disturb
the programs challenged in this case, and would leave their
improvement to the political branches, I see today's decision as one
that allows our precedent to evolve, still to be informed by and
responsive to changing conditions."8 5
disadvantaged but have since become successful" could lose their status as Disadvantaged
Business Enterprises, so that they would not unfairly benefit from the program. Id. at
2129-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, Justice Stevens pointed out that the programs
challenged in Adarand did not involve quotas or numerical requirements, but simply gave
an incentive to hire the minority, leaving the contractor a choice of whom to hire as a
subcontractor. Id- at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2131. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter first noted that Adarand
Constructors primarily wanted a ruling that a specific finding of discrimination had to be
made before the subcontractor clause would be permissible, and that the Court's discussion
of the standard of review for racial classifications was unnecessary. Id (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Souter cited to a section of the
Fullilove opinion that traced the legislative history of SBA § 8 and described it as a
remedial provision. Id at 2131 (Souter, J. dissenting) (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 465-66).
He then noted that Fullilove had justified statutes that provided remedies for past
discrimination, and that no issue had come before the Court since to change that aspect
of the Fullilove decision. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id at 2133 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. IM at 2134-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83. IM. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
84. Id. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
85. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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As the number of opinions in Adarand illustrates, a great deal of
disagreement remains among the members of the Court on the issue
of affirmative action. A similar lack of consensus as to the proper
standard of review for benign racial classifications plagues the case
history of this area. The first three important affirmative action
casesk6 -Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,' Fullilove
v. Klutznick,s8 and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education g-failed
to produce majority opinions or a clear standard of review for affir-
mative action. Later cases, specifically City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.90 and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,91 provided
majority decisions but still contained sharp dissents,92 and the
intermediate scrutiny standard put forth in Metro Broadcasting was
rejected in Adarand just five years after it was announced. 93
The first case in which the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of governmental affirmative action was Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.94 In that case, a white male,
denied admission to the medical school at the University of California
at Davis, challenged the school's special admission program which
reserved sixteen of 100 spaces in each class for disadvantaged minority
students.95 Petitioner Allan Bakke alleged that the University's
policy discriminated on the basis of race and thus violated his rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
Although the Court ordered Bakke's admission to the school,97 the
case produced no majority opinion with regard to the standard under
which courts should review such programs. Instead, a plurality called
86. In the interest of clarity and brevity, this Note discusses only that line of cases in
which governmental entities imposed racial classifications in the name of affirmative action.
For a brief summary of case law dealing with private affirmative action such as union
agreements and consent decrees, see Daron S. Fitch, Note, The Aftermath of Croson: A
Blueprint for a Constitutionally Permissible Minority Set-Aside Program, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
555, 559-69 (1992).
87. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see infra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
88. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
89. 476 U.S. 267 (1986); see infra notes 132-54 and accompanying text.
90. 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
91. 497 U.S. 547 (1990); see infra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 169-71, 180-87 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
94. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
95. Id. at 269-77.
96. Id. at 277-78.
97. Id at 320.
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for strict scrutiny in evaluating the program," but five justices agreed
that race may be considered as a factor in making admissions
decisions.99
Announcing the judgment of the Court in Bakke, Justice Powell
rejected the notion that there is any difference between racial
classifications benefiting and burdening minorities, because "[t]he
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons....
The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color."'" Calling for strict scrutiny analysis when
racial or ethnic discrimination is at issue, Justice Powell argued that
the only constitutional compelling purpose for racially preferential
classifications was that of remedying past racial or ethnic harms.'
Since there had been no finding of such harm in Bakke, the program
could not withstand strict scrutiny."° Justice Powell also addressed
the means to achieve the end and especially rejected quotas, such as
the one in the admissions process in this case, as an acceptably
tailored measure.103
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in
the judgment but dissented in part.Y This plurality, while agreeing
with Justice Powell that strict scrutiny should be applied to all racial
98. Id at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
99. Id at 315-16 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
100. I at 289-90.
101. See id. at 291, 306-20. Justice Powell stated that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions
of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."
lId at 291. The test that Justice Powell considered appropriate required that the burden
of racial and ethnic discrimination must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest." Id. at 299. The only measures that could pass this test, according
to Justice Powell, were those remedial efforts that were in response to proven
constitutional or statutory violations, "resulting in identified, race-based injuries to
individuals held entitled to the preference." lI at 301-02.
102. Id. at 309. The University's other purposes in instituting the racial classifications
had been to deliver improved health care to underserved communities and to attain a
diverse student body. fI at 310-11. The first could potentially have been a compelling
interest, but no evidence existed in the record regarding that need. Id at 310. The
second, non-remedial goal of diversity was an appropriate goal for a university, id at 311-
12, but it should be only one of many factors relevant in the admissions process, id at 314.
103. Id at 316. He stated that "the assignment of a fixed number of places to a
minority group is not a necessary means" toward the end of eliminating the effects of past
discrimination. fd
104. Id at 324 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
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classifications, 5 felt that such classifications could survive strict
scrutiny if no less restrictive measure is available." 6
Writing a separate opinion concurring in the judgment that a
university may consider the race of an applicant as a factor in
admissions,"° Justice Marshall discussed the history of racial
discrimination in the United States at length. 8 He pointed out that
"bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be
a state interest of the highest order,"'0 9 and that the Fourteenth
Amendment "was not intended to prohibit measures designed to
remedy the effects of the Nation's past treatment of Negroes." ' 0
While Justice Marshall did not specifically address an appropriate
standard of review, his opinion indicates his belief that the Court
should permit benign or remedial racial classifications.
In a short separate opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice
Marshall that racial inequality continued to be a significant social
force in the United States."' While he joined the Brennan
plurality"' in its application of strict scrutiny, he stressed that
affirmative action and the tension it creates "is part of the [Four-
teenth] Amendment's very -nature until complete equality is
achieved.""l He concluded that "[i]n order to get beyond racism,
105. Id. at 357-61 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). The plurality argued that even benign racial
classifications could be misused, and that the mere claim that a racial classification is
benign and remedial alone will not be sufficient. Id. (Brennan, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
106. l at 356-57 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Despite the application of strict scrutiny, the
Brennan opinion found that the University's interest in remedying the effects of past social
discrimination was sufficient, id& at 362 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), and that the program was
sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet this remedial goal, id. at 373-78 (Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
107. Id. at 387 (opinion of Marshall, J.). The separate opinion by Justice White which
precedes that of Justice Marshall in the case is not discussed here, because it does not
address the equal protection issue, but, rather, analyzes the case based on Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 379-87 (opinion of White, J.).
108. Id. at 387-96 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
109. Id. at 396 (opinion of Marshall, J.).
110. Id. at 396-97 (opinion of Marshall, J.). Justice Marshall continued, stating that
"[t]he Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment is the same Congress that passed
the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act, an Act that provided many of its benefits only to
Negroes." Id. at 397 (opinion of Marshall, J.) (citing ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866)).
111. Id. at 403-04. (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
112. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
113. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 405 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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we must first take account of race.... And in order to treat some
persons equally, we must treat them differently.""
Two years after Bakke, the Supreme Court again reviewed an
affirmative action program in Fullilove v. Klutznick,"5 but failed to
deliver a majority opinion regarding the standard of review to be
applied to such programs. In Fullilove, the Court upheld a set-aside
program requiring ten percent of all federal grants for local public
works projects to go to minority-owned businesses, in accordance with
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977."6 Chief Justice Burger
announced the judgment of the Court and was joined by Justices
White and Powell."7 After a thorough discussion of the history of
racism in the construction business,"' he stated that while a racially
discriminatory program "calls for close examination," deference was
due Congress because it is "a co-equal branch charged by the
Constitution with the power to 'provide for the.., general [w]elfare
of the United States' and 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the
114. ML at 407 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). The opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart is not discussed here, because it does not address
the standard of review. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
115. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion).
116. Id. at 453 (plurality opinion) (citing Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977)).
117. Id. (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 459-72 (plurality opinion). For example, the opinion discussed the hearings
that Congress conducted before passing the laws at issue in the case, in which
supporters of the [minority business enterprise] amendment echoed the sponsor's
concern that a number of factors, difficult to isolate or quantify, seemed to impair
access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities. Representative
Conyers of Michigan spoke of the frustration of the existing situation, in which,
due to the intricacies of the bidding process and through no fault of their own,
minority contractors and businessmen were unable to gain access to government
contracting opportunities.
Id. at 461 (plurality opinion) (citing 123 CONG. REc. 5330 (1977) (remarks of Rep.
Conyers)). Chief Justice Burger further stated that, in the construction industry,
participation by minority business account[ed] for an inordinately small
percentage of government contracting. The causes of this disparity were
perceived as involving the longstanding existence and maintenance of barriers
impairing access by minority enterprises to public contracting opportunities, or
sometimes as involving more direct discrimination, but not as relating to lack-as
Senator Brooke put it---"of capable and qualified minority enterprises who are
ready and willing to work."
IM. at 462-63 (citing 123 CONG. REC. 7156 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke)). Justice
Souter pointed out in Adarand that the same facts still apply to federal government
contracts today, and that the provisions at issue in Adarand should be upheld as well.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.""' 9 The
proper test, according to Chief Justice Burger, differed from both
strict scrutiny and from Justice Powell's test in Bakke,"2 and would
have the Court
inquire whether the objectives of this legislation are within
the power of Congress. If so, we must go on to decide
whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the
context presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for
achieving the congressional objectives and does not violate
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Powell concluded that
the program should survive under this test because the minority
business enterprise legislation was a sufficiently narrowly tailored
exercise of the congressional spending and commerce powers.122
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion, setting out the analysis
under the standard he proposed two years earlier in Bakke."z
Again, he concluded that the federal set-aside passed the test, based
on the compelling interest of "ameliorating the disabling effects of
identified discrimination"'24 in the construction industry.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred but found
that the appropriate standard to review benign racial classifications is
intermediate scrutiny."' They described this intermediate scrutiny
inquiry in classic terms: "whether racial classifications designed to
further remedial purposes serve important governmental objectives
and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'126
In their Fullilove dissent, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
expressed the opinion that all affirmative action is unconstitutional,
119. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (plurality opinion) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1;
amend. XIV, § 5).
120. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
121. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473 (plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 473-92 (plurality opinion) (citing U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3). Also,
while the opinion "does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis
articulated in such cases as University of California Regents v. Bakke ... [the Fullilove]
analysis demonstrates that the ... provision would survive judicial review under either
'test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions." Id. at 492 (plurality opinion) (citing
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
123. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299,305; see also supra
note 101 (setting out the standard that racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest).
124. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. ld. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
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stating that "[t]he equal protection standard of the Constitution...
absolutely prohibits invidious discrimination by government,"'" and
that "racial discrimination is by definition invidious
discrimination."" The opinion stated that while Congress deserves
deference under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, "Congress
must obey the Constitution just as the legislatures of all the States
must obey the Constitution."'29
Finally, Justice Stevens also dissented, but he rejected the
argument that no racial classification can be constitutional.' He
implicitly supported the strict scrutiny standard by stating that the
relevant statute violated equal protection because it was not narrowly
tailored; that is, it did not specifically deal with a class distinguished
by certain characteristics that made them the victims of unfair
treatment in the past and less able to compete in the future. 3'
In 1986, members of the Supreme Court again failed to agree on
a standard of review for affirmative action in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,32 in which a plurality used strict scrutiny to
strike down a race-based preference in the layoffs of teachers. 3
Following a compromise between a school board and teachers' union
providing that layoffs would be conducted based on a seniority
system, but that no greater proportion of minority teachers would be
laid off than the current percentage of minority teachers
employed,'34  several non-minority teachers challenged the
constitutionality of the plan when they were subsequently laid off. 1
127. Id at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
128. 1l at 526 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia echoed this sentiment in
Adarand. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
129. Fullilove, 448 U.S at 526 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. I& at 552-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 279-83 (plurality opinion).
134. Id at 299 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Therefore, "each group would shoulder a
portion of that burden equal to its portion of the faculty. Thus, the overall percentage of
minorities on the faculty would remain constant." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). However,
"when layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that adherence to the
[compromise] would result in the layoff of tenured non-minority teachers while minority
teachers on probationary status were retained." Id at 271 (plurality opinion). When the
school board decided not to comply with the compromise, but, rather, to lay off according
to the straight seniority system, several minority teachers who were laid off sued, and the
Court directed the school board to comply with the plan. Id. at 272 (plurality opinion).
135. I& at 271-72 (plurality opinion).
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Justice Powell, announcing the plurality opinion in Wygant,136
found that the school board's race-based layoff plan did not survive
strict scrutiny because the interest in providing minority role models
for students in order to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination
was not a sufficiently compelling goal.137 He reasoned that the
burden of layoffs was much heavier than that imposed by hiring based
on race, so that the layoff plan was not sufficiently narrowly tailored
to meet the government's interest. 3 8 Although the plurality denied
that strict scrutiny was met in Wygant, it nevertheless acknowledged
that a public employer could take race into account if "a strong basis
in evidence" suggested that prior discrimination by the government
unit was involved. 39
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, agreed with the
plurality's strict scrutiny standard of review, but expressed a slightly
more generous view of the circumstances under which an interest
would be sufficiently compelling to pass the test' than had Justice
Powell.'4 She argued that:
remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state
actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the
remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action
program. This remedial purpose need not be accompanied
by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be
accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm
basis for believing that remedial action is required. 42
Justice O'Connor also indicated that promoting racial diversity may
be a compelling interest in the context of higher education,143 but
that general societal discrimination cannot be sufficiently compelling.' 44
136. Ld. at 269 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. I&. (plurality opinion).
137. Id. at 274-75 (plurality opinion).
138. 1& at 282-83 (plurality opinion).
139. L at 277 (plurality opinion).
140. I& at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
142. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As an example of sufficient
evidence, Justice O'Connor'suggested "demonstrable evidence of a disparity between the
percentage of qualified blacks on a school's teaching staff and the percentage of qualified
minorities in the relevant labor pool." Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor here reviewed the
different standards and chose to subscribe to that of Justice Powell in Bakke. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor defined "societal
discrimination" as "discrimination not traceable to [the governmental agency's] own
actions." Id. (O'onnor, J., concurring). Justice White authored a third opinion in the
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Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Brennan and Blackmun joined.45 He first pointed out that the
Court had thus far been unable to agree on a standard of review for
affirmative action programs."' He then reiterated his stance from
Bakke47 that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate choice,'
but stated that this provision would pass review under any stan-
dard. 49
Justice Stevens also dissented.' Like Justice White,' he did
not expressly state what standard of scrutiny he would apply. He did
propose, however, yet another test for race-based classifications that
allowed this program to pass and, thus, did not appear to be as
restrictive as strict scrutiny. Justice Stevens stated that the Court
"should first ask whether the Board's action advances the public
interest in educating children for the future."'" The next step in
Justice Stevens' test was to "consider whether that public interest, and
the manner in which it is pursued, justifies any adverse effects on the
disadvantaged group."'5 Justice Stevens also pointed out that "in
our present society, race is not always irrelevant to sound governmen-
tal decisionmaking. ' ' "M
In 1989, the Court produced its first majority opinion in this area
with City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 5 That opinion, however,
only involved state and local affirmative action programs and did not
address the standard for federal programs.5 6 In Croson, the Court
case, in which he stated that the layoffs of non-minorities in order to integrate the
workforce could never be permissible. Id- at 295 (White, J., concurring). He stated that
laying off whites in order to keep blacks working was not justified by any interests asserted
by the school and could not be "save[d] ... from the strictures of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 295 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White did not
expressly state which standard of review was appropriate.
145. Id. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
148. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.)).
149. Il at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. Id at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See supra note 144.
152. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This clearly is a lower standard
than the requirement of evidence of past discrimination.
153. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). This test is much broader and less strict than the
narrow tailoring requirement.
154. Id. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
156. Id. at 490-91 (distinguishing the case from Fullilove because it deals with state and
local measures rather than federal legislation); Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110 (stating that
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dealt with a requirement of the city of Richmond that all prime
contractors to whom the city awarded contracts subcontract at least
thirty percent of the total contract dollar amount to minority-owned
and controlled businesses.5 7
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, first rejected the
argument that Fullilove v. Klutznick5 8 should compel the Court to
uphold the Richmond city contract award program, explaining that
the case was not applicable since it dealt with a federal, rather than
a local, affirmative action program."9 Justice O'Connor noted that
"[w]hat appellant ignores is that Congress, unlike any State or
political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce
the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment."'" Agreeing with the
Wygant plurality, Justice O'Connor further explained that the same
standard should apply regardless of whether the classification is
benign or burdensome to the minority. 6' She then reiterated the
Wygant requirements for a "compelling interest,"'162 stating that a
"generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an
entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to
determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy."' 63
She concluded by suggesting that a state or local entity can take
action "to rectify the effects of identified discrimination" by ending
discriminatory exclusion if a "significant statistical disparity" exists in
the industry, dealing with individual instances of racially motivated
refusals to employ minority contractors, or employing race-neutral
devices to increase accessibility of city contracts to all races.'6
4
Croson required strict scrutiny of race-based action by state and local governments but did
not declare the standard of review for similar federal legislation).
157. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78.
158. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
159. Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-91. This opinion was joined in various parts by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Id. at 475.
160. ML at 490. Justice O'Connor was referring to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See supra note 47. Justice O'Connor then engaged in a lengthy discussion about why § 5
compels a different result for state and local programs than for those instituted by the
federal government. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-93.
161. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,279-
80 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
162. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-75; see supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text
(discussing the circumstances under which an interest would be sufficiently compelling to
withstand the challenge of strict scrutiny review).
163. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
164. Id. at 509. The Court gave several examples of such race-neutral devices, including
"[s]implification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, and training
and financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races." Id. at 509-10.
1278 [Vol. 74
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Although the Croson majority opinion was a step toward a
workable constitutional analysis for affirmative action cases, the
Court's continuing lack of consensus is illustrated by the five
additional opinions in the case. Justice Stevens concurred in part and
in the judgment, but took a more lenient position, stating that he
disagreed with the idea "that a governmental decision that rests on
racial classifications is never permissible except as a remedy for a past
wrong."'1 6 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, leaned toward a
stricter interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause by rejecting the
notion that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal
government increased power to institute affirmative action."6
Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment and set out his
more narrow view of strict scrutiny, stating that the only time states
may "act by race" is when it is "necessary to eliminate their own
maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification."'67
According to Justice Scalia, even in cases of identified discrimination
in the construction industry, the government could use only race-
neutral measures.16s
Justice Marshall dissented, with Justices Brennan and Blackmun
joining, and found that the Richmond program was virtually identical
to the one in Fullilove v. Klutznick and thus should be upheld under
intermediate scrutiny.69 He chastised the majority for regarding
racial discrimination "as largely a phenomenon of the past" and for
their apparent belief that "government bodies need no longer
preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice."'70 Finally, he
found that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended
as a limit on states' powers to accomplish the aims of the Civil War
Amendments, but rather gave Congress federal power at a time when
that power was not as accepted as it is today.'
In 1990, the Court seemed to answer the question remaining after
Croson-that of the appropriate standard of review for federal
165. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
166. See id. at 518-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
167. 11 at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
168. Id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
169. Id. at 528-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 559-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The final dissent, written by Justice
Blackmun and joined by Justice Brennan, stated that this opinion represented a regression
for the Court, and that Richmond deserved praise for taking action against discrimination,
especially in light of its long history of racial discrimination. Id. at 561-62 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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affirmative action programs. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,"
the Court held that federal affirmative action programs should be
reviewed under a more lenient standard than the strict scrutiny
applied to local or state affirmative action measures.73 In Metro
Broadcasting, the Court was asked to judge the constitutionality of:
(1) the FCC's use of minority ownership and management as one of
six factors to be considered in the distribution of radio and television
broadcast licenses, and (2) the provision allowing a broadcaster whose
license is up for review or revocation to sell only to a minority
enterprise.'74
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in the case first addressed the
deference owed to Congress"5 and held that intermediate scrutiny
is appropriate when the racial preferences are "adopted by an ad-
ministrative agency at the explicit direction of Congress. '176  Thus,
the program's requirements must "serve [an] important governmental
objective... [and be] substantially related to the achievement of that
objective."'" The Court further held that the non-remedial goal of
achieving broadcast diversity is an important governmental objec-
tive.7 In addition to relying on the powers of Congress, the Court
implicitly distinguished benign race-conscious programs from those
that burden minorities and held that benign programs that pass
intermediate scrutiny are constitutional. 79
Justice O'Connor dissented and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy." The dissent
concluded that strict scrutiny should be applied because "the
Constitution's equal protection guarantees extend equally to all
172. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
173. Id at 564-65.
174. IL at 556-58. These FCC policies were created in 1978 to achieve the goal of
diversity of programming in the Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. §§ 151-55,201-21,
301-29, 401-16, 501-05, 601, 609 (1988). They were announced in the FCC's Statement of
Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 982-83 (1978).
175. Id. at 563. He stated that Congress was "a co-equal branch charged by the
Constitution with the power to 'provide for the.., general Welfare of the United States'
and 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980)).
176. Id at 563.
177. Id. at 566.
178. Id.
179. Id at 596-97. In the lone concurrence in Metro Broadcasting, Justice Stevens
restated his Croson position rejecting the proposition that "a governmental decision that
rests on racial classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong." Id.
at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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citizens." '' The justices rejected the majority's finding that Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress more power in this
situation, stating that "it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the federal
government."'" Justice O'Connor then distinguished the Fullilove
holding that Section 5 gives Congress unique remedial powers,
expounding the novel idea that "Section 5 empowers Congress to act
respecting the States, and of course this case concerns only the
administration of federal programs by federal officials."'' Justice
O'Connor also addressed the majority's treatment of "benign" racial
classifications, stating that the expression is a "contradiction in terms"
and that all "[g]overnmental distinctions among citizens based on race
or ethnicity, even in the rare circumstances permitted by our cases,
exact costs and carry substantial dangers."'"
Finally, Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Justice Scalia.
Comparing the interest in Plessy v. Ferguson..5 of train passengers'
riding comfort to the FCC's interest of the media audiences' listening
pleasure, and pointing out that the Plessy Court, too, thought that the
classifications were benign, he indicated that applying intermediate
scrutiny gives the courts too much power. 6 Justice Kennedy stated
that allowing courts to become a "case-by-case arbiter of when it is
desirable and benign for the Government to disfavor some citizens
and favor others based on the color of their skin" is dangerous and
moves the Court from " 'separate but equal' to 'unequal but
benign.' ,187
The history of affirmative action in the Supreme Court reveals
little consensus on the subject of a standard of review. In the first
three decisions, Bakke,'88 Fullilove,89 and Wygant,' the Court
181. Id. at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954)).
183. Id. at 605-06 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 609 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This opinion is consistent with Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
185. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This decision, which held that train cars could be de jure
segregated because the Equal Protection Clause was not violated as long as facilities were
"separate but equal," was subsequently overturned in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
186. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 632 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. Id at 637-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
188. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see supra notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
189. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
190. 476 U.S. 267 (1986); see supra notes 132-54 and accompanying text.
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failed to produce majority opinions regarding a standard,"' and
each case consisted of several opinions espousing different stan-
dards.'2 While Croson'93 and Metro Broadcasting appeared to
establish some guidance,9 each of those cases resulted in several
separate opinions, with disagreement on the appropriate standards for
benign racial classifications"5 and for federal, as opposed to state,
classifications.'96
Following the Court's numerous conflicting approaches to the
appropriate standard of review in affirmative action cases, Adarand
Constructors, Inc v. Pena"97 further complicated the issue because
the Court overturned its own decision.. in Metro Broadcasting to
apply strict scrutiny to all federal affirmative action programs.'99
Adarand seems to broadly restrict affirmative action programs
because its use of the term "racial classification" throughout the
opinion appears to refer to all affirmative action programs, not merely
contracting provisions.' ° Since the laws in question deal with
financial incentives to hire minority subcontractors, the decision also
extends to all racial classifications, as opposed to just quotas or set-
asides.' °' Adarand does not, however, appear to apply to "mere
outreach and recruitment efforts,"' nor does it apply to gender
191. See supra notes 97-99, 115, 132-33 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 98-114, 119-31, 136-54 and accompanying text.
193. 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see supra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
194. 497 U.S. 547 (1990); see supra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 161, 179, 184, 186-87 and, accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 159-60, 166, 171, 175-77, 182-83 and accompanying text.
197. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
198. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand addressed the factors necessary
to overturn a decision. She cited Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984), for the
proposition that any departure from precedent demands justification, and pointed out that
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940), indicates that it is acceptable to overturn
a recent decision when it collides with prior, more established doctrine. Adarand, 115 S.
Ct. at 2114-15. She further rejected the application of guidelines regarding the overturning
of stare decisis set forth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-09 (1992),
because those guidelines dealt with cases "integrated into the fabric of the law," not recent
decisions like Metro Broadcasting. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2116.
199. 497 U.S. 547 (1990); see supra note 56-57 and accompanying text.
200. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to General
Counsels E-3 (June 28, 1995) (reproduced in 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. El (June 29, 1995))
[hereinafter Justice Department Memo] ("[]t is clear from the Supreme Court's decision
that the strict scrutiny standard of review applies whenever the federal government
voluntarily adopts a racial or ethnic classification as a basis for decisionmaking.").
201. Id. ("Adarand was not a 'quota' case: its standards will apply to any classification




cases. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor explicitly stated that the
case "concerns only classifications based explicitly on race, and...
[not] laws that, although facially neutral, result in racially dispropor-
tionate impact. and are motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose." 4
Broad in scope, the Adarand decision compels the application of
strict scrutiny for all federal affirmative action programs. The
majority's use of the "consistency" principle °5 means that the
distinction between benign and burdensome racial classifications will
no longer affect the standard of review. 6  Justice O'Connor
criticized the Metro Broadcasting conclusion that courts should test
benign measures under intermediate scrutiny because "[a]bsent
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications
are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority."'
While the majority decision damages affirmative action, only two
Justices, Scalia and Thomas, supported an outright ban on such
programs."°s The other three justices in the majority and all four
dissenters left at least some room for race-based action. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined the part of Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion that states:
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence of both
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it.20
Dissenting Justices Stevens and Ginsburg indicated they believed that
a benign racial classification should be subject to the lesser standard
of intermediate scrutiny.210 Finally, in a separate dissent, Justice
203. Id.
204. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105.
205. See supra note 50 (outlining Justice O'Connor's derivation of three general
principles for governmental race classifications).
206. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111; see supra note 49 (defining benign racial clas-
sifications).
207. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
208. Id.; see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
209. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (citation omitted).
210. 1& at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Souter indicated his approval of programs meant to remedy the
effects of past invidious discrimination.'
The decision also provides a renewed look at the difficulties the
Court has had in dealing with affirmative action programs. The six
separate Adarand opinions212 demonstrate that, despite its majority
decision, the Court failed to resolve those differences. Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion characterized some of those problems.
In this opinion, Justice O'Connor clearly supported the ideal of a
color-blind society,213 but she also seemed to believe that, in reality,
racial discrimination is still prevalent in American life.214 One legal
scholar sums up the Court's difficulties this way: "The courts
generally perceive that there is persistent and persuasive racial bias
against blacks-'societal discrimination'-but they also recognize that
the majority of ordinary white people does not share that percep-
tion,"2 and "affirmative action regulation can clearly be justified
from a paternal vantage point, but is difficult or impossible to justify
from the position of equality among ordinary citizens .... For this
reason, justification of affirmative action regulation seems destined to
remain confused., 216
Although Adarand provides a new standard of review for federal
affirmative action, it lacks a great deal in terms of guidance for lower
courts. Specifically, the decision leaves open two questions. First, the
Court did not deal with the extent of deference owed to Congress by
virtue of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the Court
gave little guidance regarding the circumstances and provisions, if any,
211. Id- at 2133 (Souter, J., dissenting).
212. See supra notes 36-85 and accompanying text.
213. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 ("A free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality, should tolerate no retreat from the principle that government may
treat people differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons.")
(citation omitted).
214. See supra text accompanying note 209. Justice Marshall referred to this problem
when he accused the majority in Croson of "constitutionalizing its wishful thinking" by
believing that racial discrimination is a thing of the past. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552-53 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215. Hazard, supra note 3, at 399.
216. Id. at 381. Hazard also pointed out that the Court cannot act on a general
perception of society:
The courts cannot proceed on the basis of a social reality they perceive but which
the majority of the citizenry either does not perceive or refuses to ack-
nowledge.... The rules of procedure allow a court to "know" only those things
that are in the record .... Legally unprovable discrimination cannot be built into





that would allow an affirmative action program to survive under the
current standard.
A superficial reading of Adarand seems to indicate that the
Court's decision to review federal affirmative action under strict
scrutiny puts the federal government's power to promulgate such
measures on the same footing as that of state and local governments.
Indeed, by overturning Metro Broadcasting,217 the Court implied
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment218 does not entitle
Congress the deference Fullilove suggests. 219  The Court, however,
did not go so far as to reject expressly the notion that Section 5 gives
Congress, but not the states, some increased power to institute race-
based measures in support of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead,
the Adarand majority declined to discuss how much deference, if any,
is owed to Congress, stating only that the Court need not address the
past differences in opinion among the justices regarding the authority
that Section 5 confers.' Justice Souter, on the other hand,
expressly stated his belief that Section 5 still has a role in the
evaluation of affirmative action:
[I]t is also worth noting that nothing in today's opinion
implies any view of Congress's § 5 power and the deference
due its exercise that differs from the views expressed by the
Fullilove plurality.... Thus, today's decision should leave§ 5 exactly where it is as the source of an interest of the
national government sufficiently important to satisfy the
corresponding requirement of the strict scrutiny test."
Justice Stevens pointed out various instances in which the Court
expressly stated that affirmative action at the state and federal levels
is to be treated differently,' and he accused Justice O'Connor of
vacillating on the issue, quoting her statement in Croson that
"Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific
217, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that intermediate scrutiny should be applicable to
federal affirmative action programs).
218. See supra note 47 for a discussion of § 5.
219. 448 U.S. 448,472 (1980) (plurality opinion); see supra note 119 and accompanying
text for Chief Justice Burger's statement regarding § 5.
220. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
221. Id at 2133 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 563 (1990) (referring to the "institutional competence" of Congress); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-24 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing the "sound distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on
race"); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (referring to the "appropriate
deference to the Congress")).
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constitutional mandate to enforce ... the Fourteenth Amendment.
The power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define
situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality
and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations. 2  He
also stated:
Ironically, after all of the time, effort, and paper this Court
has expended in differentiating between federal and state
affirmative action, the majority today virtually ignores the
issue.... Such silence, however, cannot erase the difference
between Congress' institutional competence and
constitutional authority to overcome historic racial sub-
jugation and the States' lesser power to do so.224
In a reaction to the Adarand decision, an assistant U.S. Attorney
General interpreted the Court's decision as leaving "open the
possibility that, even under strict scrutiny, programs statutorily
prescribed by Congress may be entitled to greater deference than
programs adopted by state and local governments."2" He stated
that "[t]he Court in Adarand hinted that at least where a federal affir-
mative action program is congressionally mandated, the Croson
standards might apply somewhat more loosely."z
While acknowledging the continuing existence of racial
discrimination and stating that some government action to address it
is permissible,227 the Adarand opinion also failed to give clear
guidance as to just what an affirmative action program would need to
survive strict scrutiny. The past is an unreliable guide-while the
Court has indicated in various cases what can justify governmental
action based on race, those statements provide little help because the
Court had not agreed on a standard of review' and has
223. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at
490 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted)).
224. Id. at 2125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Justice Department Memo, supra note 200, at E-3.
226. Id. at E-10. Assistant U.S. Attorney General Dellinger continued:
The Court ... cite[d] the opinions of various Justices in Fullilove, Croson, and
Metro Broadcasting concerning the significance of Congress' express
constitutional power to enforce the antidiscrimination guarantees of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments .... Some of those opinions indicate
that even under strict scrutiny, Congress does not have to make findings of
discrimination with the same degree of precision as a state or local government,
and that Congress may be entitled to some latitude with respect to its selection
of the means to the end of remedying discrimination.
Id.
227. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; see supra note 209 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 86-187 and accompanying text.
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contradicted itself from one opinion to the next.229 And while
"Adarand basically extends the Croson rules of affirmative action to
the federal level,"" 0  Croson has drawn criticism for providing little
guidance on what, and how much, evidence is needed to justify a
compelling government interest. For example, Croson did not
determine whether the government may "introduce statistical evidence
showing that the pool of qualified minorities would have been larger
'but for' the discrimination that is to be remedied."' '  It did not
discuss the value of anecdotal evidence, and it omitted discussion
about the burden of persuasion regarding the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs.1 2  Finally, Croson did not "resolve
whether a government must have sufficient evidence of discrimination
at hand before it adopts a racial classification or whether 'post-hoc'
evidence of discrimination may be used to justify the classification at
a later date." 3  Despite the criticism, the Adarand Court failed to
provide any more guidance regarding the evidence needed. Further-
more, the Court in both Croson and Adarand left unanswered the
question of "if and when affirmative action may be adopted for
'nonremedial' objectives, such as promoting racial diversity and
229. Compare Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,566 (1990) (holding that
the nonremedial goal of enhancing broadcast diversity is a compelling governmental
interest) with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 300-02 (1978)
(illustrating that the only cases in which racial preferences have been approved in the past
have been those remedial uses where-they were in response to proven constitutional or
statutory violations). Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498
(1989) (stating that "a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an
entire industry" does not justify government action) and id. at 501-03 (stating that a
statistical disparity in the racial representation in the construction industry may be
sufficient proof of a compelling interest) with Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 274 (1986) (holding that "some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental
unit involved" is necessary before racial classifications may be used to remedy such
discrimination).
230. Justice Department Memo, supra note 200, at E-3.
231. IL at E-5.
232. Id.
233. Id.; see also Nina Farber, Comment, Justifying Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson: The Court Needs a Standard for Proving Past Discrimination,
56 BROOK. L. REv. 975, 976 (1990) ("The question the Croson Court failed to address is
what standard should be adopted for determining the existence of discrimination.... [T]he
decision merely describes an 'outer perimeter of unacceptable behavior.' "); Lori Jayne
Hoffman, Comment, Fatal in Fact: An Analysis of the Application of the Compelling
Governmental Interest Leg of Strict Scrutiny in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 70
B.U. L. REV. 889, 892 (1990) ("The majority ... failed to reach a consensus as to the
quantum of evidence sufficient to find a compelling governmental interest in an affirmative
action program.").
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inclusion."'  Because Adarand was based on a law justified by
remedial goals, the majority was silent on this issue."5  In Metro
Broadcasting, however, the Court upheld a federal affirmative action
program based on the nonremedial goal of enhancing broadcast
diversity, 6 but it decided that case under intermediate, rather than
strict, scrutiny. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens indicated that the Metro
Broadcasting holding is still relevant after Adarand:
The majority today overrules Metro Broadcasting only
insofar as it is "inconsistent with [the] holding" that strict
scrutiny applies to "benign" racial classifications promul-
gated by the Federal Government. The proposition that
fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to justify
such a program is not inconsistent with the Court's holding
today.9
This question, however, may remain until the Court has cause to
decide, under strict scrutiny, the constitutionality of an affirmative
action program based on nonremedial goals.
Since the decision gives little guidance beyond the strict scrutiny
standard, one must look to previous cases in order to predict the
future of affirmative action post-Adarand. Over the years, these have
identified a number of criteria that, if met, will make it more likely
that a program will survive strict scrutiny. Certainly, the fact that a
program is a remedial measure is an important factor.238 There are,
234. Justice Department Memo, supra note 200, at E-5.
235. Id..
236. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990).
237. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
Court's past treatment of nonremedial goals, see Justice Department Memo, supra note
200, at E-5 to E-6. Assistant Attorney General Dellinger wrote:
[T]here has never been a majority opinion for the Supreme Court that addresses
the question [of nonremedial goals]. The closest the Court has come in that
regard is Justice Powell's separate opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), which said that a university has a
compelling interest in taking the race of applicants into account in its admissions
process in order to foster greater diversity among the student body.
Id. at E-5. Assistant Attorney General Dellinger continued:
On the other hand, portions of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson and her
dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting appear to cast doubt on the validity of
nonremedial affirmative action programs.... [But n]owhere in her Croson and
Metro Broadcasting opinions did Justice O'Connor expressly disavow Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke. Accordingly, lower courts have assumed that Justice
O'Connor did not intend to discard Bakke.
Id. at E-5 to E-6.
238. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 497 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("IT]his
Court has never approved race-conscious remedies absent.., findings of constitutional or
legislative violations."); see also supra notes 101, 142 and accompanying text.
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however, several other factors that have been explicitly or implicitly
included in the several cases.
For example, one Bakke plurality 9 advocated strict scrutiny for
racial classifications.' In discussing reasons why the University of
California's program should survive that standard, the opinion
indicated at least three factors or circumstances that facilitate an
affirmative action program's survival under strict scrutiny. First, the
opinion stated that it is in the program's favor that it does not
"stigmatiz[e] the program's beneficiaries or their race as inferior.""24
Second, no race-neutral way was available to achieve the same goals
"in the foreseeable future."'242 Moreover, the fact that the school
did not "simply equate minority status with disadvantage," but rather
"consider[ed] on an individual basis each applicant's personal history
to determine whether he or she has likely been disadvantaged by
racial discrimination,"'243 was a third positive factor. In Fullilove,
Justice Powell noted the "factors upon which the Courts of Appeals
have relied," such as "(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the
planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the
percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage
of minority group members in the relevant population or work force;
and (iv) the availability of waiver provisions."'  Further, in
Wygant, the plurality that struck down the program and the dissent by
Justice Marshall indicated that programs that "take race into
account,"'245 and those in which "[r]ace is a factor,"' are
preferable to those that consist of quotas or set-asides. Also, four
justices in Wygant indicated that the burden suffered by the non-
minority as a result of minority preference is an important con-
sideration.4 7 In Croson, Justice O'Connor's opinion indicated that
239. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 262,324 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
240. Id at 358-61 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part); see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
241. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
242. Id. at 376 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
243. Id. at 377 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). This factor seems to indicate that the presumption of
disadvantage in the Adarand laws may not pass muster so easily.
244. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510-11 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
245. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (plurality opinion).
246. Id. at 309 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 280-82 (plurality opinion); id at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the more specific the evidence of past discrimination, the more likely
a program would pass muster,2" and she stated that "a generalized
assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry"
is not a sufficiently compelling goal or rationale for an affirmative
action program.249 She then stated that one example of evidence
proving past discrimination is "a significant statistical disparity
between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able
to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors
actually engaged by the locality."'  She also emphasized the
importance of first considering race-neutral measures.P Justice
O'Connor again discussed favorable factors in Metro Broadcasting,
stating that it would be better to favor minorities, if at all, on "a case-
by-case determination," or if there is a waiver provision, and if race-
neutral means have been exhausted 52
A second way to determine what might allow a program to
survive strict scrutiny is to look at a race-related case decided just
seventeen days after Adarand. In Miller v. Johnson, 3 the Court
used strict scrutiny to declare unconstitutional a Georgia electoral
district based primarily on race.' Like Adarand, Miller suggests
that this Court is fairly serious about eliminating most racial clas-
sifications, but the Court articulated several factors that, if satisfied,
might have allowed the electoral district to survive." The Miller
Court indicated that race-neutral classifications that only have a
disparate, or increased, impact on race are most likely to be
upheld." The Court also emphasized that remedial goals will
generally provide a compelling interest, stating that "[t]here is a
'significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial
discrimination.' "' Further, the Court held that race may be a
248. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,492 (1989) (plurality opinion).
The factors that come out of this case are especially enlightening because they were
articulated by some of the same justices who were in the Adarand majority.
249. Id at 498 (opinion of the Court).
250. Id at 509 (plurality opinion).
251. Id at 507 (opinion of the Court), 509-10 (plurality opinion).
252. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 621-22 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
253. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
254. Id. at 2482-94.
255. Id. at 2488-90.
256. Id. at 2490 (stating that "[a] State is free to recognize communities that have a
particular racial makeup, provided its action is directed toward some common thread of
relevant interests").
257. Id (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993)).
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factor in the redistricting process, but it may not be the predominant
factor.5'
To summarize, the Court's various decisions dealing with race-
based classifications have identified the following factors as relevant
in deciding whether or not the classification can survive strict
scrutiny: 9  (1) remedial as opposed to nonremedial programs;
(2) the stigma the minority endures as a result of the classification;
(3) the consideration of race-neutral alternatives; (4) the individual or
case-by-case analysis of the preferential treatment is preferred to a
quota or set-aside; (5) the temporary nature of the remedy; (6) the
burden the non-minority experiences as a result of the classification;
(7) the statistical evidence used to prove past discrimination; and
(8) race as a "plus" factor in decisionmaking as opposed to a quota
or set-aside.
The Adarand decision, then, severely limits affirmative action
programs. It applies to federal affirmative action programs a standard
under which no benign racial classification has ever been upheld by
the Supreme Court.2" In addition, the political climate today seems
to indicate that affirmative action will be eliminated, if not by the
judiciary, then by the legislature.26'
By imposing the strict scrutiny standard and by ignoring any
authority that the federal government may have under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment,262 the Adarand Court illustrated a
strong skepticism of the federal government and its vast powers. This
was also demonstrated by the Court's conclusion in Johnson v.
258. Id. at 2488. The Court stated
Redistricting legislatures will, for example, almost always be aware of racial
demographics; but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistricting
process.... The plaintiff's burden is to show ... that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters
within or without a particular district.
Id. (citations omitted).
259. See also Justice Department Memo, supra note 200, at E-4 to E-9 (discussing the
detailed requirements of the compelling interest and narrow tailoring prongs of strict
scrutiny, and some factors which will allow programs to pass).
260. See, eg., Thomas J. Madden & Kevin M. Kordziel, Strict Scrutiny and the Future
of Federal Procurement Set-Aside Programs in the Wake of Adarand: Does 'Strict in
Theory' Mean 'Fatal in Fact'?, 64 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 133, 135 (Aug. 7, 1995) ("[The
strict scrutiny test] is nearly impossible to overcome. Not since 1944 has the Supreme
Court approved a race-based classification that was subject to review under the strict
scrutiny standard.") (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
261. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Miller" that the Justice Department's requirement of more
majority-minority districts was not a compelling interest.264 Adarand
further conveyed the increasing interest of the Court in finally
achieving a colorblind society: "In the eyes of government, we are
just one race here. It is American."2" Justice Blackmun articulated
that goal, but also foresaw the potential difficulty in achieving it, when
he stated in Bakke that
the time will come when an 'affirmative action' program is
unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic of the past. I would
hope that we could reach this stage within a decade at the
most. But the story of Brown v. Board of Education,
decided almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that that
hope is a slim one.2"
Sixteen years after that statement, "we are not ... a colorblind
society, and... race has a deep social significance that continues to
disadvantage blacks and other Americans of color. 267
Forcing the judicial standards of a colorblind society on the
society in which we live probably will not make that society a reality
any faster. Professor Aleinikoff has persuasively argued that "[w]hile
the legal strategy of colorblindness achieved great victories in the
past, it has now become an impediment in the struggle to end racial
inequality. ' 268
The Adarand decision, however, was sufficiently vague on the
questions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-and the
circumstances under which affirmative action can survive-that the
law remains uncertain enough to allow the federal government to
maintain some type of affirmative action programs. There remains,
of course, the alternative of creating race-neutral programs with the
263. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
264. Id. at 2491.
265. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119. This colorblind ideal is also illustrated in Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), in which the Court stated that" '[r]acial gerrymandering,
even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens
to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a
goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation
continues to aspire.' " Id. at 2486 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993)).
266. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1979) (opinion of
Blackmun, J.) (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
267. Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1062.
268. Id. Professor Aleinikoff goes so far as to suggest that in today's society, a
"remedial regime predicated on colorblindness will have little influence at this deep level
of social and legal consciousness because it cannot adequately challenge white attitudes




same goals. Until the Court revisits this issue, however, or Congress
passes one of the proposed bills that would end the use of racial
preferences, 69 and as long as the program is designed with the
relevant factors2' in mind, Adarand has left a narrow crack in the
door so that the federal government should be able to maintain
limited race-based measures to assist minorities in escaping the
continuing effects of past discrimination.
KAREN B. DIETRICH
269. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 238-59 and accompanying text.
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